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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Summary of Plaintiffs Claims.
This is an appeal from dismissal of plaintiffs claims on summary judgment. Plaintiffs

first claim is for property damage to a 5th wheel trailer that occurred on July 11, 2014, when the
trailer hit an orange traffic barrel in a construction zone on 1-90 near Kellogg. R p. 10, par. 7; p.
11, par. 8-11. Plaintiff alleges the barrel was out of line with adjacent barrels, and that the Idaho
Department of Transportation ("IDT") was negligent in placing and maintaining the barrel. R p.
10, par. 7; p. 11, par. 8. Plaintiffs second claim is for declaratory and injunctive relief relating
to portions of the motorcycle and driver's manuals published by the State, which plaintiff alleges
misrepresent the law and/or prescribe standards which present a danger to motorists. R p. 11,
par. 17. In its Answer, IDT denied the allegations of negligence and denied the allegations
relating to the motorcycle and driver's manuals. R p. 14, par. 2 - 3; p. 15, par. 8.
II.

Procedural History.
The lawsuit was filed on August 20, 2015. R p. 10. The trial court issued its Scheduling

Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial Order on April 20, 2016, setting a trial date of
February 21, 2017. R p. 90, L. 9-13. The Scheduling Order provides that motions for summary
judgment "shall be timely filed so as to be heard not later than ninety-one (91) days (thirteen
weeks) before Trial." R p. 90, L. 9-13. IDT filed separate summary judgment motions on
plaintiffs two claims, and the motions were noted for hearing on November 22, 2016 in
compliance with the Scheduling Order. R p. 37, L. 1-4 and R p.64, L. 1-4. This was exactly 13
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weeks before trial, and the last possible date for hearing summary judgment motions under the
Scheduling Order. Trp.18,L.21-25; Trp.19,L.1-4.
Plaintiffs response to IDT's motions was due 14 days before the hearing, on November
8, 2016. Instead of timely responding to the motions, plaintiff filed an untimely motion under
IRCP 56(d), requesting that the Court defer ruling on the IDT's motions while plaintiff
conducted additional discovery. R p. 68-70. Plaintiffs motion was faxed to defense counsel at
9:44 p.m. on November 10, 2016 and it was filed with the court on November 14, 2016. R p. 8,
68, 72. Plaintiff later filed a memorandum on November 17, 2016 opposing IDT' s summary
judgment motion regarding the declaratory judgment and injunction claims. R p. 82-83. At the
summary judgment hearing on November 22, 2016, the trial court heard argument regarding
plaintiffs IRCP 56(d) motion, but denied the motion. Tr p. 5, L. 25 - p. 21, L. 4. Both sides
then presented argument on the merits of the summary judgment motions, although plaintiffs
counsel declined to present argument regarding plaintiffs negligence claim. Tr p. 25, L. 4-5.
The court took IDT' s motions under advisement, and issued its Memorandum Decision and
Order on Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment on December 20, 2016, granting both
motions. R Vol. I, p. 89 - 101.
III.

Facts Pertinent to Plaintiffs Negligence Claim.
At the time of the incident, plaintiff, Dea Haight, and her husband G.W. Haight were

towing their 5th wheel trailer east on I-90.

Mr. Haight was driving.

R p. 56, L. 1-22 of

deposition page 8. At Kellogg, there were traffic control barrels straddling the line dividing the
right and left lanes, and traffic was diverted to the left lane. R p. 56, L. 1-25 of deposition page
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9. The Haights claim one of the traffic barrels was "out of place" and they were unable to avoid
hitting it with their trailer. R p. 57, L. 7-15 of deposition page 11; L. 7-15 of deposition page 13.
At the time of the incident, 1-90 between Kellogg and Osburn was under construction.
The general contractor was Knife River Corporation - Northwest.

The traffic control

subcontractor was Eclipse Traffic Control & Flagging, Inc. R p. 49. On June 30, 2016, plaintiff
filed a separate lawsuit in Kootenai County District Court against Knife River and Eclipse
Traffic Control, alleging the exact same property damage claim as is alleged in this action. R p.
49, 61-63. In that suit she claims the contractors were negligent with respect to the out of place
barrel. Rp. 61-62.
Even assuming the barrel was "out of place" for purposes of summary judgment, Mr. and
Mrs. Haight testified in their depositions that they (1) had no knowledge as to how the barrel got
out of place; (2) had no knowledge as to how long the barrel was out of place; and (3) had no
knowledge that anyone from IDT put the barrel in that position. R p. 60, L. 21-23 of deposition
page 27; L. 3-14 of deposition page 28; R p.57, L. 13-23 of deposition page 16.
IV.

Facts Pertinent to Plaintiff's Declaratory/Injunctive Relief Claim.
Plaintiff claims that she is lawfully licensed to operate motor vehicles in the State of

Idaho pursuant to a motor vehicle Operator's license duly issued by IDT. R p. 11, par. 14.
Plaintiff states she is and may be subjected to written and other tests by the IDT and its agents
with respect to plaintiff's ability to lawfully operate a motor vehicle. R p. 11, par. 15. Plaintiff
claims some portions of manuals and test questions published by IDT misrepresent the law
and/or prescribe standards of conduct in operating a motor vehicle which present a real and
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present danger of serious physical injury to persons who may adhere to the practices prescribed
by IDT. R p. 11, par. 17. Lastly, Plaintiff claims that she and other residents of the State of
Idaho are at risk of failing to qualify for licenses to which they are entitled and risk injury and
property damage based on improper and misleading information published by IDT with regard to
properoperationofmotorvehicles. Rp.12,par.18.
Plaintiff stated in her deposition that her declaratory claim was based only on the motor
vehicle manual. R p. 25, L. 1-25, deposition p. 22. She testified specifically that she does not
hold a motorcycle license in Idaho, she has only taken a written test to operate a motor vehicle in
Idaho once, and she has never been injured while operating a motorcycle. R p. 25, L. 2-25,
deposition p. 24.

Furthermore, plaintiff testified the only reason she brought forth the

declaratory action was because of the fifth wheel incident. R p. 26, L. 1-4, deposition p. 26. The
plaintiff has failed to present any evidence or testimony of a personal injury or a causal
connection between any injury, the incident that took place on July 11, 2014, and the manuals in
order to establish standing. R p. 31, L. 12-14.
ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of Review.
This Court reviews a summary judgment order under the same standard the district court

used in ruling on the motion. Kolln v. Saint Luke's Reg'! Med Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 327, 940
P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997).

That is, summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings,

depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
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genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of showing that no genuine
issues of material fact exist. Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, 149 Idaho 679, 683, 239
P.3d 784, 788 (2010). This burden may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an
element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho
308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct. App. 1994). Once such an absence of evidence has been
established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via depositions,
discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial, or to offer a valid
justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(d). Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., l 25
Idaho 872,874,876 P.2d 154,156 (Ct. App. 1994). Disputed facts and reasonable inferences are
construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Castorena v. Gen. Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 613, 238
P.3d 209, 213 (2010).
The determination of a Rule 56(d) motion is within the trial court's discretion. A district
court does not abuse its discretion in denying such a motion if it recognized it had the discretion
to deny the motion, articulated the reasons for doing so, and exercised reason in making the
decision. Fagen, Inc. v. Lava Beds Wind Park, LLC, 159 Idaho 628, 633, 364 P.3d 1193, 1198
(2016); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380, 386 (2005). The
district court need not expressly state that it had discretion to deny the motion if its articulation
of the reasons for denying the motion show that the court knew it had discretion to grant or deny
the motion. Fagen, 159 Idaho at 1198.
II.

The Trial Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs IRCP 56(d) Motion.
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The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the Rule 56(d) motion because
(1) the motion was not timely filed, (2) plaintiff failed to meet her burden to specify what

additional discovery would reveal and how it would preclude summary judgment, and (3)
plaintiff failed to diligently pursue discovery.
A.

The Motion was Not Timely Filed. IRCP 56(b)(2) provides that any opposing

documents must be served at least 14 days before the hearing.

Likewise, IRCP 7(b)(3)(A)

provides that motions must be filed and served at least 14 days prior to the hearing.

Here,

plaintiffs motion under Rule 56(d) was due on November 8, but was not served until November
10 (albeit by fax at 9:44 p.m.), and was not filed until November 14. The motion was not timely
and the district court would have been justified in denying the motion on that ground alone.
B.

Plaintiff Failed to Meet Her Burden Under Rule 56(d). IRCP 56(d), formerly

numbered 56(t) but substantively identical, provides as follows:
If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,
the court may:
(1)
(2)

(3)

defer considering the motion or deny it;
allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take
discovery; or
issue any other appropriate order.

A party seeking a continuance under Rule 56(d) "has the burden of setting out 'what
further discovery would reveal that is essential to justify their opposition,' making clear 'what
information is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment.' "Jenkins at 386 (2005).
The trial court may consider the moving party's lack of diligence in pursing discovery in ruling
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on a Rule 56(d) motion. Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd, 154 Idaho 99, 105,
294 P.3d 1111 (2013).
In Jenkins, the plaintiff requested additional time to respond to a motion for summary
judgment because the case was "complex" and there were outstanding requests for written
discovery and depositions. Jenkins at 385. In the supporting affidavit, the plaintiff's attorney
stated that "he believed the discovery would produce additional documents and testimony
supporting the Jenkins' theories, and that he required the opportunity to use the responses and
testimony in additional discovery in order to thoroughly respond to summary judgment." Id.
The Supreme Court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion
because "the affidavit ... did not specify what discovery was needed" to properly respond to the
summary judgment motion, "and did not set forth how the evidence he expected to gather
through further discovery would be relevant to preclude summary judgment." Id. at 386.
Similarly, in Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation, the district court denied a plaintiff's
Rule 56(f) motion for additional time to conduct discovery. Taylor, 151 Idaho 552, 572, 261
P.3d 829, 849 (2011).

The court noted that the plaintiff had more than a year to conduct

discovery and the motion did not set forth what relevant information the plaintiff needed or
provide a "reasonable basis to believe additional discovery will produce new or relevant
information not previously disclosed .... "

Id. The Supreme Court affirmed, noting the plaintiff

had failed to rebut "the district court's finding that he failed to point to any information or
document that may be relevant to" his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id.
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In the present case, plaintiffs counsel stated in the Rule 56( d) motion that he sought
through written discovery the identity of "persons authorized by Defendant to work on Interstate
90 at the time and place of the accident." R p. 68. He goes on to state that he will need to
depose such persons "with regard to their knowledge of facts relevant to these proceedings" once
they have been identified. R. p. 68. Counsel failed, however, to specify what these depositions
would reveal and how it would preclude summary judgment. Therefore, as in the Jenkins and
Taylor cases above, plaintiff failed to meet her burden under Rule 56(d), and the district court

properly denied the motion.
C.

Plaintiff Failed to Diligently Pursue Discovery. Plaintiff conducted no discovery

in this case for approximately 14 months. It was only after IDT completed written discovery and
deposed plaintiff and her husband on October 12, 2016 that plaintiff served defense counsel with
written discovery requests. R p. 78. These requests were timely answered by IDT on November
10, 2016, although plaintiffs counsel conceded he had not read the responses yet by the time of
summary judgment hearing on November 22, 2016. R p. 80-81; Tr, p.15, L.8-10. IDT timely
filed its summary judgment motions so they would be heard in compliance with the deadlines in
the district court's Scheduling Order. The district court properly considered plaintiffs lack of
diligence in denying the Rule 56(d) motion.
D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the 56(d) Motion. In

ruling on the Rule 56(d) motion at the summary judgment hearing, the district court stated that
the motion itself "was inadequate to indicate what specific information would be needed from
discovery .... " Tr p. 8, L.21-23 of p. 19. The court also noted that the motion was not filed
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timely, but more important to the court was plaintiffs failure to engage in discovery for over a
year after the case was filed. Tr p. 8, L.24 -25 of p. 19 and L.1-4 of p. 20. The court stated:
And while the Court is sympathetic to how life can really get in
our way - and you've had a lot of issues lately 1, and the Court is
sympathetic to those issues - nevertheless, discovery was not
engaged in when it could have been, and so to indicate that
additional time is needed when this summary judgment motion is
scheduled for the last possible date that the scheduling order would
allow is simply too late, and I'm going to deny the 56(d) motion,
and we are going to continue with argument on the summary
judgment motion itself today.
Tr p.20, L.19-25 of p. 20 and L.1-4 of p. 21.
It is apparent that the court recognized it had the discretion to grant or deny the 56(d)
motion, articulated the reasons for denying the motion, and exercised reason in making the
decision. The court did not abuse its discretion.
III.

Plaintiffs Negligence Claim was Properly Dismissed Because There was No Evidence of
Actual or Constructive Notice by IDT.
The elements of a negligence claim are: "(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the

defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal
connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or
damage."

Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., v. Massey, 155 Idaho 942, 947-48, 318 P.3d 932, 937-38

(2014) (quoting Nation v. State of Idaho, Dep't of Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 189, 158 P.3d 953, 965
(2007)).

1 In response to IDT's argument that plaintiff had not been diligent in conducting discovery, plaintiff's counsel had
earlier told the court about having computer problems beginning in August 2016, car problems in September,
roofing problems in October, some medical and dental appointments in September and October, and some other
miscellaneous items in that general time frame. Tr. p.6, L.14 - p.11, L.3.
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With respect to dangerous conditions on highways, the State has a duty in certain
situations to either make the condition safe or warn motorists of the condition. The State is
subject to liability when it creates or maintains a dangerous condition on the highway if it:
(1) knows of or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover such
condition, and
(2) should realize that the condition, involves an unreasonable risk of harm
to those using the highways, and
(3) should expect that persons using the highway will not discover or
realize the danger, and
(4) fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe or to
adequately warn of the condition and the risk involved, and,
(5) the persons using the highway do not know or have reason to know of
the condition and attendant risks. (emphasis added).
Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 804, 473 P.2d 937, 946 (1970)(superseded by statute on other

grounds as stated in Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 725 (1986)). See also, Leliefeld
v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 362, 659 P.2d 111 (l 983)(State has duty to warn motorists of a

known dangerous condition on a public highway).
In the present case, plaintiff cannot establish the first element above from the Smith case,
i.e. that IDT had actual or constructive notice of the out of place barrel. This is an essential

element of her claim on which she has the burden of proof. Both plaintiff and her husband
testified they had no knowledge as to how the barrel got out of place, how long it had been out of
place, or that anyone from IDT put the barrel in that position. R p. 60, L. 21-23 of deposition
page 26; L. 3-14 of deposition page 27; R p.58, L. 13-23 of deposition page 16. IDT challenged
an essential element of plaintiffs negligence claim, and the burden shifted to plaintiff to
demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact as to actual or constructive notice by IDT.
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Plaintiff failed to meet her burden, and her negligence claim was properly dismissed by the
district court.

IV.

The Trial Court Properly Dismissed Plaintiffs Declaratory/Injunctive Relief Claim for
Lack of Standing.
"It is a fundamental tenant of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to invoke a

court's jurisdiction must have standing." Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102,104, 44 P 3d
1157, 1159 (2002) citing Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15
P.3d 1129,1132 (2000). "Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court
before reaching the merits of the case on appeal." Id. citing Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho
635, 637 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989). The Idaho Supreme Court has previously noted the doctrine
is imprecise and difficult to apply. Id. citing Miles at 641, 778 P.2d at 763 (citing Valley Forge
College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982)). "Standing

focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issue the party wishes to have adjudicated." Id.
citing Van Valkenburgh at 124, 15 P.3d at 1132; Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County,

128 Idaho 371,375,913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996) (quoting Miles at 639, 778 P.2d at 761). "To
satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must 'allege or demonstrate
an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the judicial relief requested will prevent or
redress the claimed injury."' Id. (emphasis added). "This requires a showing of 'distinct
palpable injury' and 'fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the
challenged conduct.'" Id citing Miles at 639, 778 P.2d at 761 (emphasis added).
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Just as she did in the district court, plaintiff directs this Court's attention to Idaho Code
§67-5278 and Rawson v. Idaho State Board of Cosmetology, as evidence that she clearly has
standing.

Rawson, 107 Idaho 1037, 695 P.2d 422 (Ct. App. 1985).

Section 67-5728 only

provides a mechanism or claim for a person injured or threatened to be injured by a rule to bring
a claim. The statute alone does not automatically provide standing or a justiciable interest. I.C.
§67-5278. Section 67-5278 allows for a declaratory action " ... if it is alleged the rule, or its
threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal
rights or privileges of the petitioner." The requirements to obtain a declaratory action similar to
Idaho Code §67-5278 are also found in Idaho Code § 10-120 as follows:
Any person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by
a statute ... may have determined any question of construction or
validity ... and obtain a declaration ofrights, status or other legal relations
thereunder.
Idaho Code §10-1202. (emphasis added).

The Rawson case recognized a right that was

interfered with, or impaired by the rule in question and was sufficient to confer standing under
I.C. §67-5207. Rawson at 426.
IDT's argument is NOT that plaintiff cannot bring a case under the U.S. Constitutional
right to petition for personal grievance or plaintiff's right to due process. U.S. Const. amend. I,
V and XIV § 1 and Idaho Const. art 1, § 18. IDT' s argument is that plaintiff has not established
standing to bring this claim. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that the burden of
establishing standing rests on the plaintiff. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,340341 (2006). The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that standing is a preliminary question to be
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determined by this Court before reaching the merits of the case. Young at 1159. The Idaho
Supreme Court did not take away a person's right to bring forth a case in the courts of Idaho, but
made a requirement that the person must have standing, a controversy or injury, before the
plaintiff can bring forth evidence to establish the merits of their case.
Plaintiff has failed to provide testimony or evidence of the first requirement of standing;
injury in fact due to the Defendant's driving manual and, therefore, has failed to demonstrate
standing to bring forth a claim and her declaratory/injunctive claim was properly dismissed by
the district court.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion under Rule
56(d). The motion was not timely filed, plaintiff failed to meet her burden under Rule 56(d) of
specifying what additional discovery is needed and how it will preclude summary judgment, and
plaintiff failed to diligently pursue discovery for over a year before IDT' s motions were filed.
IDT challenged an essential element of plaintiff's negligence claim, i.e. that IDT had
actual or constructive knowledge of the out of place traffic barrel. The burden shifted to plaintiff
to demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact as to actual or constructive notice by IDT.
Plaintiff failed to meet her burden, and her negligence claim was properly dismissed by the
district court.
IDT also challenged an essential element of plaintiff's declaratory action, i.e. that
Plaintiff has standing to sustain a declaratory action. The burden then shifted to the Plaintiff to
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demonstrate standing by providing evidence or proof of an injury. Plaintiff failed to meet her
burden, and her declaratory and injunction actions were properly dismissed by the district court.
~
Dated this 'l-(-of July, 2017.

STATE OF IDAHO
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT

Renee R~Hollaner: Vogelpohl
Deputy Attorney General
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SDAG for Idaho Department of Transportation

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this

2/

lliday of July, 2017, I caused to be served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

G.W. Haight
Attorney at law
113 7 E Skyline Drive
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

D U.S. Mail (Certified)
D Hand Delivered
[gJ Overnight Mail
D Telecopy (Fax)
[g] Email

Legal Section
Idaho Transportation Department

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 19

